






















Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 20, 2017




Paper presented at The ZHW-Symposium
Publication date:
2003
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Harremoës, P. (2003). Policy Implications from 'Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle
1896-2000'. In Paper presented at The ZHW-Symposium
Poul Harremoës, prof.                                          Environment & Resources DTU  
Technical University of Denmark                Building 115, 2800 Lyngby,Denmark 
 
d:\my documents\e&r\artikler, engelsk\2003\03-10-02 zürich symposium.doc 
 Last saved: 20-09-2003 13:58 
 






Policy Implications from 'Late Lessons from Early 
Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896-2000' 
 
By:  Poul Harremoës, professor  
 Environment and Resources DTU 
 Technical University of Denmark 




Policymakers face the unenviable task of making difficult decisions on behalf of 
society in situations of uncertainties, ignorance, and high stakes. In doing so, they 
will want to avoid the mistakes of the past. The European Environment Agency has 
published a book in an attempt to evaluate the history of mistakes of the past: "The 
Precautionary Principle - Late Lessons from Early Warnings 1896-2000". The 
primary lessons synthesised from 14 case studies are summarised in the report 
(EEA, 2001, Harremoës et al., 2002). This paper will focus and further elaborate on 
key issues arising from the “Late Lessons from Early Warnings” book.  The idea is 
to extract the issues, which may help policymakers and the public to identify ways 
of avoiding such mistakes in the future.  Some of these issues are raised in the 
European Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC, 2000), 
and in other related policy proposals: some relevant extracts are therefore included. 
 
The precautionary principle is a frame of thinking that governs the use of foresight 
in situations characterised by uncertainty and ignorance and where there are 
potentially large pros and cons of both regulatory action and inaction. Within this 
frame of thinking there are a number of interpretations, approaches and concrete 
actions that can be taken to implement the principle. This paper is a synthesis of the 
lessons, translated and elaborated to address an audience facing the dilemmas 
associated with the decision making regarding issues involving high stakes 
combined with uncertainty and ignorance.  
 
The issues will be addressed on the basis of three different interpretations of the 
lessons learned from the “Late Lessons from Early Warnings” book: 
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1. Normative interpretation, experience due to ignored warnings.  
How can policymakers reduce the chances and impacts of surprises? How 
long can it take between first exposures to harmful agents, their damaging 
impacts, and recovery? How valuable is long term monitoring? Does more 
research reduce scientific uncertainties? 
2. Balanced proof interpretation of evidence of benefits and harm.  
How much evidence of harm is needed to justify precautionary action? Who 
carries the burden of proof of “safety”?   
3. The 'pro et con' interpretation  
What is a broad interpretation of the Precautionary Principle? How 
comprehensive were the assessments of the costs and benefits of 
precautionary action/inaction?  
 
Terminology 
It is important to distinguish between three terms: Precautionary principle, 
precautionary approach and precautionary action.  
• The precautionary principle can be interpreted as a framework of thinking 
that governs the use of foresight in situations characterized by uncertainty, 
ignorance and ambiguity, and where there are potentially large pros and cons 
of both regulatory action and inaction. As a principle it has a legal standing 
that has implications on the application of the principle in the international 
arena. In the European Union, precaution is interpreted as a principle and has 
legal standing, and has been adopted as such in the EU Maastricht Treaty of 
1992 (EU, 1992).  
• The precautionary approach is a way of doing things along the same lines of 
thought as outlined above, but an approach has no legal standing. In 
international trade disputes, USA tends to interpret the precautionary 
principle as an approach and not a principle having legal standing.  
• A precautionary action is a measure taken to implement the thoughts behind 




Policy statements for reduction of the risks and impacts of surprises 
The case studies show that some actions can help anticipate, identify earlier or 
minimise the impact of “surprises”. The following statements have the character of 
normative statements, by which the risks and impacts of surprises due to uncertainty 
and ignorance can be reduced:  
 
• Use knowledge of the intrinsic properties of a substance or activity when assessing 
possible impacts, e.g.. If a chemical substance is persistent or it bioaccumulates, a long-term 
effect that may be hazardous should not be disregarded.  
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• Reduce irreversibility, where possible. This is a good general principle, due to the mere 
fact that any error in the risk assessment may have long lasting negative effects and may 
even be impossible to remediate, CFCs, PCBs, MTBE (climate change), etc. 
• Use a diversity of robust and adaptable technological options to meet needs. This helps 
to limit technological “monopolies” such as that of asbestos, CFCs, PCBs, etc. and thereby 
the scale of the surprise.  
• Use a variety of scientific disciplines as well as “lay” and “local” knowledge in risk 
assessments 
• Reduce specific exposures to potentially harmful agents on the basis of credible early 
warnings of initial harmful impacts, thus limiting the size of any other surprise impacts from 
the same agent. Eg asbestos, PCBs.  
• Reduce the general use of energy and materials via radically greater (e.g. 10 times) eco-
efficiencies, so as to reduce overall environmental burdens, thereby limiting the scale of 
future surprises. 
• Use liability measures (e.g. legal duties and insurance bonds) to compensate for potentially 
harmful impacts and to provide an investment fund in case “surprise” occurs. 
• Use of prospective analyses and scenarios. These help foresee unintended consequences. 
• More long-term environmental and health monitoring and more research on cause-
effect relationships to enable “early warnings” of surprises. 
• Better dissemination of research results for improved “early warnings” detection. 
 
 
Time lag from exposures to impacts versus time to recovery  
There is a systematic discrepancy between the time lag from the first exposures to 
harmful impacts on the one side and the time to recover from such harmful impacts 
after the chain of events has started to unfold. This time element is essential, because 
it reveals a systematic tendency to be late with regulatory actions, even when 
responding to early warnings. The conclusion is that it is never too early to address 
an issue at the first indications, even suspicions of harmful effect. Subsequently, the 
actions to be taken depend on the character of the indications and the options 
available, varying from intensified research and monitoring to regulatory actions. 
 
Table 1 illustrates with examples from the case studies. 
 
Table 1: Time to Harm and Time to Heal?  
Chapter Time to Harm Time to Heal 
Asbestos Asbestosis (10-25 years) Irreversible disability 
 Lung cancer (10-30 years) Death (1-5 years) 
 Mesothelioma cancer (20-50 years) Death (1-2 years) 
CFCs “Hole” in ozone layer (30-70 
years) 
Slow recovery (50-100 years) 
 Skin cancer (30-40 years after 
exposure to higher UV radiation) 
Recovery or death depending on cancer type 
(2-30 years) 
 Reduced immune response (0-5 
years?) 
Temporary or permanent? 
 Plant productivity (0-12 months) Depends on species 
DES Cancer in 2nd generation  (25-35 
years) 
Recovery or death (5-20 years)  
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MTBE Groundwater contamination (1-25 
years) 
“Permanent” (i.e. many decades) 
PCBs Cancer (10-25 years) Recovery or death (2-40 years) 
 Neurotoxicity (2-40 years) Permanent damage? 
Fishing Depleted or destroyed stocks 
(decades) 
Temporary or permanent losses (years-
decades) 
Radiation Cancer (5-40 years) Recovery or death depending on type (2-30 
years) 
Acidification 
of lakes  
Sulphur depositions from fossil 
fuels acidifies lakes (20-50 years) 
Recovery, even with artificial liming of 
lakes, is taking several decades; fish can take 
another 20 years to recover after that. 
Source: EEA . “Time to Harm and Heal” concepts were inspired by Swedish EPA, 2001 
 
The time taken for evidence of impacts to emerge is also relevant to the generation 
of “false negatives”, i.e. harmful substances or activities that were once considered 
to be not harmful. For example, “experience with human cancer shows that, in some 
cases, the period from first exposure to the development of clinical cancer is seldom 
less than 20 years: latent periods substantially shorter than 30 years cannot provide 
evidence for lack of carcinogenicity” (Vainio et al, 1992). Therefore 
epidemiological surveys showing no evidence of late developing cancers, where the 
period since first exposure is less than 20 years, may provide poor evidence for a 
lack of carcinogenicity. It is this long “time to harm and then time to heal” that often 
justifies use of the precautionary principle in public policymaking.  
 
The costs of applying the precautionary principle must not be disproportionate to the 
benefits expected, (the “proportionality principle”) but when the benefits from 
avoided harm lie far out in the future, proportionality is harder to assess, as the 
Communication from the European Commission points out- see Box.1. 
 
Box 1: Proportionality and time 
“Measures based on the precautionary principle must not be disproportionate to the desired level 
of protection … The risk reduction measure should not be limited to immediate risks where the 
proportionality of the action is easier to assess. It is in situations in which the adverse effects do 
not emerge until long after exposure that the cause-effect relationships are more difficult to prove 
scientifically and that  - for this reason – the precautionary principle often has to be invoked. … 
Risks that are carried forward into the future cannot be eliminated or reduced except at the time 
of exposure, that is to say immediately”.  
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Balanced proof interpretation  
The level and burden of proof of harmful effects used in decision making is the main 
element in what could be called the “balanced proof” interpretation of the 
precautionary principle. The interpretation is expanded from a simplistic 
interpretation based on normative statements about how to act to an analytical 
interpretation where a balance has to be achieved between alternative interpretations 
of the basis for action. The main point is that decisions regarding provision and 
evaluation of evidence depend on the situation of concern. It is a predominant 
philosophy that an activity, a structure, a chemical is considered harmless until 
proved harmful. It is up to the opponent to prove harmfulness in a liability case 
against the promoter of the activity.  That burden of "proof" can be very hard to lift. 
The basic question is whether this common attitude is fair. It is not a question of 
science, interpreted as natural science. It is a question of fairness, which is an ethical 
issue to be addressed by the policy makers. As will be shown below, society has 
realised this on numerous occasions in the past, and has introduced regulatory 
measures in order to deal with that very issue. The Precautionary Principle is just a 
mere step in analysing the fairness issue resulting from uncertainty and ignorance in 
the regulatory process. 
 
3.1 Level of evidence 
Various international agreements invite use of the Precautionary Principle when 
there is “less than full scientific certainty” over the link between the potentially 
hazardous activity and harmful impacts; but they do not indicate what “less than” 
means. As we have seen above, this “triggering factor” can involve establishing just 
“reasonable grounds for concern”, according to the EU Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle. This evidence need not include quantifiable estimates of 
risk (see Box 2).  
 
Box 2 “The Triggering Factor” 
“Once the scientific evaluation has been performed … it may provide a basis for triggering a 
decision to invoke the precautionary principle. … The absence of scientific proof of the 
existence of a cause-effect relationship, a quantifiable dose/response relationship, or a 
quantitative evaluation of the probability of the emergence of adverse effects … should not be 
used to justify inaction. Even if scientific advice is supported by a minority fraction of the 
scientific community, due account should be taken of their views, provided the credibility and 
reputation of this fraction are recognised”. 
(CEC Communication on the precautionary principle, 2000, para. 6.2) 
 
 
In general, as the case studies illustrate, the high level of proof that is appropriate for 
good, natural science is rarely appropriate for the very different activity of sound 
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policymaking in situations of serious and possibly irreversible hazards, where lower 
levels of proof, such as the “balance of evidence”, may be more appropriate.  
 
There are different levels of proof used for different purposes in society and the 
choice as to which level of proof to use in which circumstances, is essentially an 
ethical rather than a scientific question, as the following examples illustrate.   
 
For example, criminal trials use a high level of proof, (“beyond all reasonable 
doubt”) where the “cost” of being wrong in one direction i.e. innocent people being 
jailed, or sometimes executed, is regarded as being less acceptable than being wrong 
in the other direction (i.e. guilty people going free).  
 
For other legal purposes, such as compensating people who have been injured 
through accidents, a lower level of proof is often used in the courts, e.g.: “the 
balance of probabilities”. Society considers that the costs of being wrong in using 
this lower level of proof i.e. compensating injured people for injuries that were not 
caused by the negligence of others, is more ethically acceptable than being wrong in 
the other direction, i.e. not compensating people for the injuries that were caused by 
the negligence of others.  
 
In science, a high level of proof is also used, such as “reasonable certainty”. 
Scientists consider that it is less damaging for science when a new scientific 
hypothesis that fails to reach this high level of proof eventually turns out to be 
correct (called a “false negative”) than when a hypothesis is initially accepted which 
later proves to be incorrect (a “false positive”) (Cranor, 1999 and Harremoës, 2003).  
 
But which level of proof is appropriate for public policy decision-making on 
potentially hazardous substances or economic activities? 
 
The higher the level of proof used in evaluating the scientific evidence on potentially 
hazardous substances, the greater the chance that there will be “false negatives”. For 
example, substances like asbestos and benzene were regarded as safe until much 
evidence of harm had been assembled. Similarly, waiting for “convincing “ evidence 
of over-fishing can lead to misplaced confidence in the harmlessness of current 
fishing activities.  In both cases choosing lower levels of proof can avoid the costly 
“false negatives” described in the case studies. However, the lower the level of proof 
used in decision making the greater the chance of identifying  “false positives” i.e. 
regarding substances or activities as harmful but which turn out to be harmless.  
Choosing appropriate levels of proof for policymaking therefore involves choosing 
between the likelihood and costs of being wrong, i.e. between restrictions on an 
economic activity that turn out to be unnecessary, or no restrictions on the economic 
activity that turns out to be harmful, sometimes irreversibly so. 
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Burden of proof 
The basic principle in western societies is that an activity is harmless until proven 
harmful. It is the accusing party that have to prosecute the promoter of the activity in 
order to stop the activity and claim compensation for any harm done by the activity.  
 
In recent years, the liability of the promoting party has been strengthened and 
liability has become a regulatory mechanism of increasing importance. However, the 
case studies show eloquently that it can be very difficult indeed for laymen to 
provide evidence of harmfulness - not the least when the proof of harm has to stand 
up to the rigour of scientific proof. This prevalent condition has been regulated in 
order to compensate for the virtual impossibility of this demand on laymen and the 
lack of fairness. Either a "regulatory authority" has taken over the "burden of proof" 
on behalf of society or the "burden of proof" has been transferred to the promoter of 
the activity.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the location of the burden of proof for some key economic 
activities in the EU.   
 
Whether the burden of proof is currently allocated to the promoter of the activity or 
to a public authorities, depends upon whether the activity is considered to be 
intrinsically harmful, e.g. pesticides, or, as with “existing” chemicals, whether it was 
practical to establishing post-market testing for thousands of chemicals. The 
Swedish Chemicals Act 1975 provides a clear illustration of both different levels of 
proof and different locations of the burden of proof in the same legislation. It 
requires the Public Authority to take precautionary action on a chemical substance 
based on a “scientific suspicion of risk” but then the burden of proof passes to the 
producer of the substance, who has to show that it is harmless “beyond all 
reasonable doubt”. This example illustrates that a high level of proof is needed to 
show harmlessness when there is already evidence of potential hazard, whereas a 
lower level of proof is needed to demonstrate potential harm when harmlessness is 
assumed.  
 
The basics of level and burden of proof is:  
• If the a-priory assumption is that the activity is harmless and the activity is not 
regulated, then the burden of proof rests with the layman, who by tradition has to 
show a high level of evidence of harmfulness in court to demand stop of the 
activity and claim compensation. The question is whether this is fair? 
• If the a-priory assumption is that the activity is harmful and an authority is in 
charge of regulation, then the burden of proof on the part of the authority require 
a lower level of proof as the basis for regulation. On the other hand, the burden 
of proof rests with the promoter of an activity, if the promoter seeks exemption 
from regulation, then the promoter has to provide a high level of proof in order 
to demonstrate harmlessness.  
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Table 2: Who has the burden of proving  
‘No Unacceptable Harm*1’? Some EU examples: 
Burden of Proof mainly on: 
Economic Activity: Producer Public Authorities 
Medicines √  
Pesticides √  
Food Additives √  
Power Stations √  
“New”*2 Industrial Chemicals √  
“Existing” Industrial Chemicals  √ 
Fishing  √ 
Many new technologies*3  √ 
✓= carries the main burden of proof: either  on producers as part 
of specific marketing authorisation or permitting procedures; 
or on Public Authorities when needing to demonstrate harm 
from already permitted activities 
Producer  = those who propose to market the substance, agent or activity 
Public Authorities = the publicly funded authorities responsible for specifically 
authorising or permitting the substance etc; or who identify 
harm from existing activities 
 
*1: Confidence in this level of ‘safety’ depends upon the extent and quality of the “pre-market” 
assessment and testing 
*2:‘New’ means chemicals placed on the EU market after 1981. All others (some 70-100 000 substances) 
are registered as ‘existing’ in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Substances (EINECS). See 
Chemicals in Europe: Low Doses, High Stakes? (EEA/UNEP, 1998) 
*3: There are some pre-market safety standards to be met for some consumer products. 
• If the a-priory assumption is that the activity is harmful and the promoter of an 
activity has the burden of proof, then the promoter has to provide a high level of 
proof in order to demonstrate harmlessness. 
 
It has to be noted that it is virtually impossible to prove harmlessness, because it is 
in principle impossible to cover all circumstances. The level of proof has to be 
lowered to a level that can be achieved in practise. The tool is to establish procedural 
__________________________________________________________________ 8 
Telf. +45-45-251599                                                                  Fax. +45-45-932850 
E-mail: ph@imt.dtu.dk                                     Homepage: http://www.imt.dtu.dk  
Poul Harremoës, prof.                                          Environment & Resources DTU  
Technical University of Denmark                Building 115, 2800 Lyngby,Denmark 
 
mechanisms and institutions that generate confidence in society. It is possible to 
prove harmfulness, because just one substantial case is in principle enough. 
However, in practise it can be very difficult to do so. The choice is a question of 
fairness and equity. Who shall bear the burden of the risks of harmfulness? It is a 
political decision to decide: What is the a-priori assumption? Who should carry the 
burden of proof? What level of proof should be demanded?  
 
In general, carrying the burden of proving a reasonable degree of “safety” - for 
ultimate proof of safety is impossible- provides an incentive to avoid harm, which is 
one reason why applying the precautionary principle involves placing the burden of 
proof on the proponents of an activity-see Box 3  
 
 
Box 3 The burden of proof 
Action taken under the head of the precautionary principle must in certain cases include a clause 
reversing the burden of proof and placing it on the producer, manufacturer or importer, but such 
an obligation cannot be systematically entertained as a general principle. This possibility should be 
examined on a case-by-case basis”. 
(CEC Communication on the Precautionary Principle, 2000, para. 6.4) 
 
 
The EU White Paper on “Chemicals Strategy” (2001) proposes a gradual switch of 
the burden of proof for existing chemicals from the “Public Authorities” to the 
“Producers”. 
 
The case studies illustrate that the burden of proving pre-market “safety” may also 
involve obligations to : 
• justify the technology in relation to the benefits claimed, as with radiation; 
and to  
• show that alternative ways of meeting needs are likely to be more 
hazardous or disproportionately costly, as with the French asbestos ban, and, 
implicitly, in most of the case studies.  
Such “comparative risk assessment” is required under the EU Biocides Directive.   
 
The case studies also show the value of such post-marketing actions by producers 
as: 
• monitoring  the impacts of the technology; and  
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The 'pro et con' interpretation 
The "pro et con" interpretation involves the whole spectrum of analyses of the issues 
associated with the Precautionary Principle. Precaution cannot stand alone, but has 
to be viewed in combination with other principles, that are part of governance of 
society. The ultimate interpretation is a balancing act between various concerns, 
values and ethical, judicial and political judgement. 
 
The Precautionary Principle deals with the grey transition from what we know to 
what we do not know. This grey zone of transition is characterised by uncertainty 
and ignorance. It is in this zone that new developments provide the chances of 
benefits and the risks of harm. It is in this grey zone that ideas give rise to 
innovations and suspicions give rise to fear of harm. In both cases, the characteristic 
is that we may not know the consequences, success or failure. The Precautionary 
Principle is the result of a growing awareness of an imbalance between the high 
esteem for innovations and the disregard for suspicions. The principle is an attempt 
to shift that balance in favour of an increased awareness of the uncertainties and the 
ignorance, which tend not to be recognised in the process of decision making in the 
grey zone of transition. A key to the interpretation is that this grey zone of transition 
is not only governed by scientific approaches, but as much by intuition with regard 
to ideas for development and for suspicions of potential harm. Accordingly, the 
regulation of this zone should not be governed solely by scientific judgement of 
proof, but should be governed by society on the basis of principles associated with a 
balance based on social, judicial, political and ethical sciences and concerns.  
 
The balance of the Precautionary Principle 
Box 4 provides a broad interpretation of the precautionary principle that arises from 
the “Late lessons” report. It includes the “balanced proof “ interpretation, which 
focuses on the level of proof needed for regulatory action, and embraces other 
features that are needed to help deal with situations of uncertainties, ignorance and 
high stakes. The elements included below build on the German and some US 
interpretations, in light of the Case Studies and the “Late Lessons from Early 
Warnings” book. 
 
Box 4 A broad interpretation of the Precautionary Principle arising from “Late Lessons 
from Early Warnings”. 
The Precautionary Principle is a framework of thinking that governs the use of 
foresight in situations characterized by uncertainty and ignorance and where 
there are potentially large pros and cons of both regulatory action and inaction. 
 
Two main types of policy actions: 
• Precautionary action to reduce harm in the face of scientific uncertainty 
using an appropriate level of proof; and 
• Proportional action so that the likely costs of precautionary action does not 
grossly outweigh the likely benefits. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Plus five other main features: 
• A commitment to monitoring/detecting “early warnings” via research and long-
term environmental and health monitoring 
• Maximizing stakeholder participation in the assessment and management of 
potentially harmful economic activity so as to minimise the overall “harm/costs 
of being wrong” (including political, economic and health harm/costs) 
• Integrated, comprehensive and transparent assessments of technologies, 
activities and potential hazards based on scientific, lay, and local knowledge 
and evidence, and covering all pros and cons 
 of the economic activity (or agent) 
 of alternatives and 
 of a variety of actions/inactions to minimise the cons and 
maximize the pros. 
• Open recognition of uncertainties, of gaps in knowledge and their research 
implications 
• Maximizing the incentives for harm prevention via the “polluter pays 
principle”; a better balance between the generation of “false negatives” and 
“false positives”; changing the paradigm to "harmful unless proven harmless" 
and locating the burden of proof of “safety” on the technology producer.  
 
Comprehensive assessments of "pro et cons" 
In the “Late Lessons from Early Warnings” book the term: "pro et con" was used, 
because it was found that the usual term: "cost and benefit" was a term associated 
with a lot of misunderstanding and conflict. Such misunderstandings/conflicts are 
based on two frequently held views on "cost and benefit":  Environmental issues are 
not suitable for cost-benefit analysis, because it is a common perception that cost-
benefit does not and cannot incorporate non-economical concerns, like long term 
value of nature (a view contested by some environmental economists) and that 
economically dominated cost-benefit analyses have been misused as an instrument 
for preconceived ideas about regulation. As a consequence, the term: "pro et con" is 
the term of choice to characterise the balance between all opposing concerns. 
 
Much policymaking in the case studies was based on assessments that had 
significant gaps, particularly concerning: 
• non-economic aspects and wider pros and cons  
• justification of the benefits claimed for the technology 
• alternative ways of meetings needs;  
• secondary or spillover benefits, additional to the main benefit; and  
• distribution of benefits  and harm between groups in society and between 
generations. 
• decisions based on a small group of experts without consultation and 
participation of a wider audience of the public, who may have different sets 
of values compared to a select group of experts. 
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For example, the benefits of the hazardous substance, or economic activity, were not 
subject to much critical scrutiny but accepted as obviously proven by, for example, 
increased economic activity or sales of the substance. Radiation is an exception, 
where a formal “justification” of benefits has long been required, but here too the 
case study shows some uses of radiation that were of little benefit, yet they carried 
significant risks. 
 
This failure to scrutinise benefits, combined with the failure of the market prices of 
the hazardous agents to reflect full environmental and health costs, also held up the 
development and sale of alternatives to the hazardous technology. When alternatives 
were developed they often turned out to be technically and, from society’s 
viewpoint, economically superior. Better analysis of alternatives at an earlier stage 
of the technology assessment can stimulate innovation.  
 
“No regrets” precautionary policy measures are where the secondary benefits are 
likely to exceed the overall costs of achieving them, thereby making them cost-
effective even if the primary (and sometimes less certain benefit) does not 
materialise. A current example is where the reduction of fossil fuel combustion to 
combat climate change can produce quick and large secondary gains from the health 
benefits of cleaner air. Similarly, the cost of the EU programme to combat 
acidification from sulphur dioxide and other pollutants is much higher if fossil fuel 
targeted climate change policies are not being adopted at the same time. Broad, 
integrated assessments of technologies are needed to capture these interconnections 
of the real world.  
 
In all cases studies, non-economic considerations needed to be included in any 
broad assessment of the overall pros and cons of the economic activity. – see Box.5  
 
Box 5 The benefits and costs of action and lack of action 
“The measures adopted presuppose examination of the benefits and costs of action and lack of 
action. This examination should include an economic cost/benefit analysis when this is 
appropriate and feasible. However, other analysis methods, such as those concerning efficacy 
and the socio-economic impact of the various options, may also be relevant. Besides the 
decision-maker may, in certain circumstances, be guided by non-economic considerations 
such as the protection of health. 
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It is noteworthy that several of the case studies hazards originated from the desire to 
be sustainable by recycling wastes into more useful products (e.g. BSE, AFA): the 
potential benefits and hazards of recycling need careful scrutiny. 
 
The distribution of benefits and harm between different groups was often poorly 
analysed, particularly between generations. Many of the case study subjects had 
“long-tail” effects lasting several decades into the future.  
 
However, there is a mismatch between the timescales used by most markets, 
politicians, consumers and businessmen (minutes to 5 years) and the timescales 
needed to protect fish, observe cancers or reverse acidification, and ozone layer 
damage. (decades to centuries).  
 
In most of the case studies, future costs were often largely ignored or discounted 
(implicitly or explicitly) to today’s values. This is a common way of “externalising” 
some of today’s costs of production onto future generations .The EU is currently 
proposing liabilities legislation to help remove this market distortion -see Box.6.  
Some economists have proposed liabilities bonds as a means of dealing with the 
costs of future but unknown impacts (Cornwell and Costanza, 1999) 
 
Box 6 EU White Paper on Environmental Liability 
“Reasons for introducing an EC liability regime include improved implementation of key 
environmental principles (polluter pays, prevention, and precaution) and of existing 
environmental laws (P7) 
...environmental liability results in prevention of damage and in internalisation of external 
costs. Liability may also lead to the application of more precaution, resulting in avoidance of 
risk and damage and may encourage investment in R&D for improving knowledge and 
technologies” (p14) 
 
(European Commission “White Paper on Environmental Liability”, Com (2000) 66 final feb.) 
 
Detecting “unknown” liabilities that may arise in the future requires some form of 
long term monitoring, but was this kind of information available in the case studies?  
 
It can take many years to discover the biological or ecological mechanisms that 
explain a link between activities and harmful impacts, e.g. the 30 years between 
observing the association between polluted water and cholera and identifying the 
cholera vibrio, which explained the link. Precautionary action on reducing impacts 
often has to anticipate knowledge of mechanisms by many years. In the case studies 
there are still many scientific unknowns several decades after the early warnings of 
harmful impacts were identified, despite years of research. 
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The key features of the broad interpretation of the Precautionary Principle in relation 
to comprehensive, integrated analysis, assessment and decision making are: 
• incorporate all concerns of all stakeholders in framing the issue 
• account for all "pro et cons" in the analysis and assessment 
• explicitly account for the risk of being wrong due to uncertainty and 
ignorance, and for the potential consequences of wrong decisions 
• demonstrate accountability and transparency in the analysis and assessment 
in order to generate confidence 
• consult all parties, stakeholders and the public by participation to account for 
different values and priorities 
• weigh all factors against each other in the process of decision making 
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